Each week Sam types one rule into Daniel's machine to show how God should have built the world. Behind every rule is a debate philosophers and theologians have carried on for centuries. Here is each one, with the strongest voices on both sides.
Spoiler-light. This page tells you the rule Sam types each Saturday and the real debate behind it. It never tells you how a world breaks or what Sam and Daniel conclude. That is the book's job.
Chapter 1
The question underneath all of them
Is there room for God in a world like this?
That is the title of the public debate Sam is in on the first page of the book, and it sits underneath every Saturday that follows. Philosophers call it the problem of evil, and it is one of the oldest arguments there is.
It comes in two strengths. The strong version says that an all-good, all-powerful God and the evil in our world simply cannot both exist; it is a contradiction. The more modest version says the amount and kind of suffering we see makes God unlikely, even if not impossible. Most philosophers today, believers and skeptics alike, think the debate is now mainly about the second version, which is why the book keeps testing specific worlds instead of trading slogans.
Epicurus, as reported by Lactantius (about 300 AD), and restated by David Hume in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). Is God willing to prevent evil but not able? Then he is not all-powerful. Able but not willing? Then he is not good. Both able and willing? Then where does evil come from?
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880). Ivan Karamazov does not argue that God is impossible. He says no future harmony could be worth the suffering of one child, so he respectfully returns his ticket.
Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (1999). A Christian philosopher who took the worst evils head on: a good God must make each sufferer's life, taken as a whole, a great good to that person, not just balance the books for the universe.
Chapters 3 and 4
A world where no one can doubt
The rule Sam types
Every person on earth, from the beginning of the world, knows God is there. Not as a feeling or a guess. As a fact, plain as the sun, all day, impossible to doubt.
The question: If God exists and wants a relationship with us, why isn't his existence obvious to everyone?
Sam's first complaint is the one at the top of his list: hiddenness. If God is real and loving, why do sincere people look for him and come up empty? So he turns the light all the way up. Then he tries two smaller settings: God showing up once a week, and a private sign for anyone who sincerely asks.
Philosophers have argued about this one hard since the 1990s, and it is now one of the main arguments against belief.
The case that it counts against God
J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). A perfectly loving God would always make a relationship with himself possible for anyone who is not resisting it. Since there are honest, open-minded people who do not believe, there is good reason to think that God does not exist.
Theodore Drange, Nonbelief and Evil (1998). The argument from nonbelief: a God who wanted everyone to believe in him could easily have made it clearer, so widespread unbelief counts as evidence against him.
Bertrand Russell, as recalled by Leo Rosten (1974). Asked what he would say if he met God after death, he answered: "Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence!"
The case for belief
Blaise Pascal, Pensées (published 1670). God gives "enough light for those who only desire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition." Faith should be possible for anyone who wants it without being forced on anyone who does not.
Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (1844). A king who loves a humble maiden comes to her as a servant, because arriving in all his glory would overwhelm her and win only awe, not love.
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966). "Epistemic distance": people need room to come to God freely, which an overwhelming, undeniable presence would take away.
Michael Murray, "Coercion and the Hiddenness of God" (1993). A God who was always unmistakably present would coerce us the way a police officer in the room does. We would behave, but our choices would no longer be fully our own.
"Enough light to walk toward. Enough dark that the walking's yours."Daniel, Chapter 4
People stay people. The world stays the world, bad years and all. Floods, cancer, bad harvests. Same city, same week in June, same four people. I'm taking out the ability to refuse. Nobody can choose against love.
The question: Could God have made free people who always choose the good? If he could, why didn't he?
The standard Christian answer to evil is free will: God made people able to love, and that means able to refuse. Sam goes after the answer directly. If most harm starts with somebody saying no to somebody who needed a yes, take out the no.
The case that it counts against God
J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955). If it is possible for one free person to choose the good on one occasion, it is possible for every free person to choose the good every time. An all-powerful God could have made that world, so free will does not explain evil.
Antony Flew, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom" (1955). Freedom does not require the ability to do otherwise in some deep sense; a person acting from their own good character is free. So God could have made people who are both free and always good.
The case for belief
Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace (about 427). The first humans were "able not to sin." The redeemed at the end are "not able to sin." The difference is the road between: goodness that has been chosen, tested and grown into is not the same thing as goodness installed at the factory.
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (1974). The free will defense. If people are truly free, whether they choose good is up to them, not God; it is possible that any world of free creatures God could make would contain some wrong. Many philosophers, including skeptics, now grant that this answers the strong, logical version of the problem.
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952). Free will, "though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having."
Every need met before the asking can form. Food, rent, medicine, a ride home. Nobody ever has to ask God or anybody else for anything.
The question: If God already knows what we need and is good, why ask at all? And why do so many prayers seem to go unanswered?
Unanswered prayer is where a lot of people's doubt starts, usually in a hospital. Sam's fix skips the paperwork: a good God would meet the need before anyone has to beg.
The case that it counts against God
Francis Galton, "Statistical Inquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer" (1872). Royal families, prayed for by whole nations every Sunday, did not live any longer than other wealthy people.
The STEP study, Benson and colleagues, American Heart Journal (2006). Among about 1,800 heart surgery patients, being prayed for by strangers made no measurable difference to recovery.
The puzzle in its simplest form. If God's will is already perfectly good, then asking either changes nothing, or it means God would have held back something good unless someone begged. Neither sounds like a loving parent.
The case for belief
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (II-II, question 83). We do not pray to change God's mind but to receive what God planned to give through our prayers. Prayer is one of the real causes God chooses to work through.
Blaise Pascal, Pensées. God instituted prayer "to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality."
Eleonore Stump, "Petitionary Prayer" (1979). In a friendship between a far greater and a far weaker person, asking protects the weaker one from being overwhelmed or spoiled. It keeps the relationship a relationship and not a vending machine.
"Some prayers get answered with a person instead of an outcome."Chapter 5
No human body can be hurt or made sick, by anything or anybody. Wherever a fall or a flood or a fire or a fist or a tumor would have hurt a person, it doesn't.
The question: Why would a good God make a world where bodies break, and where nature hurts people nobody can blame?
Free will can explain a punch. It is harder to see what it explains about a tumor or a flood. Philosophers call these natural evils. Sam's padded world keeps everything else the same and takes away physical harm.
The case that it counts against God
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), Part XI. Hume lists features of nature that seem unnecessary for a good designer: pain as an alarm when a lessening of pleasure would do, rigid laws that never bend for anyone, creatures given barely enough to survive, and nature's "inaccurate workmanship." Remove any one, he says, and suffering would shrink.
J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955). If courage and compassion need suffering to exist, then cruelty and cowardice need it too, and the answer just moves the problem up a level.
The case for belief
Irenaeus (2nd century) and John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966). The world is a "vale of soul-making." Courage, compassion, patience and trust can only grow in a place where real harm is possible and choices have weight.
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (1940). Free people need a shared world with fixed rules. If a wooden beam went soft as grass whenever someone swung it as a weapon, nothing anyone chose would matter.
Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (1998). We can only learn to help or to harm, and choose responsibly, in a world where actions have reliable consequences.
Every wrong is forgiven the second it's done. By the law, by the church, and by the person it was done to. No cops for it, no court, no jail, no fine, no bill. Nobody owes anybody anything, and nobody can hold anything against anybody.
The question: Why can't God simply forgive? What is the cross for, and is it fair for an innocent person to pay for the guilty?
Sam puts it the way he would put it to a friend. If I owe you a hundred dollars and you forgive it, you tear up the note. You don't go find an innocent man and make him cover it. So why would a forgiving God need a cross?
The case that it counts against God
Faustus Socinus, On Jesus Christ the Savior (1594). If a debt is truly forgiven, nothing is owed. If it is paid, it was not forgiven. Demanding payment and calling it forgiveness does not add up.
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). Moral guilt is not like a money debt. It belongs to the person who did the wrong and cannot be handed to someone else.
The common moral objection. In every other setting, punishing an innocent person for someone else's crime is what we call injustice.
The case for belief
Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man (1098). Wrongdoing creates a real debt that humanity owes and cannot pay. Only someone who is both God and human can pay it, so God pays it himself.
John Stott, The Cross of Christ (1986). The cross is not God punishing a third party. It is "the self-substitution of God": the judge himself takes the cost on.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (1937). "Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness without requiring repentance." Forgiveness that costs nothing and changes nothing is not grace.
Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (1989). Real reconciliation involves repentance, apology, making amends and sometimes penance. Forgiving someone is not the same as pretending nothing happened.
"I forgave him. It took me most of that year to do it. But I didn't give him the keys back."Dwayne, Chapter 8
From the first people on, when people die they don't leave. Their spirit stays among the living, seen and heard, as they were the day they died. Nobody can touch them, and they never change.
The question: Is the Christian hope of resurrection a comfort people invented, or is there a real case for it?
Everybody at a funeral says she's in a better place. Fine, Sam says: then let her stay where we can see her. The world he builds raises a second question too: what did the first Christians actually claim, and why?
The case that it counts against God
David Hume, "Of Miracles," in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). A wise person weighs testimony against all of human experience. Testimony to a miracle is almost never strong enough to outweigh the evidence that the dead stay dead.
Bart Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted (2009) and How Jesus Became God (2014). The four Gospel accounts disagree on details such as who reached the tomb first and what they saw. Belief in the resurrection may have begun with visions, of the kind grieving people still report.
Gerd Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus (1994). The appearances are best understood as visionary experiences, first by Peter and then by others.
The case for belief
Paul, 1 Corinthians 15:3 to 8. An early statement of belief that most scholars date to within a few years of the crucifixion. It lists named witnesses and says most of the five hundred "are still alive." In other words: go and ask them.
N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (2003). In the first century, "resurrection" meant a body, not a ghost, and nobody expected one man to be raised before the end of the world. The empty tomb together with the appearances best explains why the belief arose at all.
Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (2004). The "minimal facts" approach builds only on facts that most critical scholars, including skeptical ones, accept.
At the end of every life, every person goes into the presence of God, whatever they said or did. Nobody is sent away. The door is welded open.
The question: Could a good God let anyone be lost forever? Or would forcing everyone into heaven be its own kind of cruelty?
Before they start, Daniel reads the hardest passages aloud in full so neither of them gets to pick the pretty pages. Christians themselves disagree about hell more than most outsiders realize, so this section has three sides, not two.
The case that it counts against God
Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (1927). "I do not myself feel that any person who is really profoundly humane can believe in everlasting punishment."
The proportion objection, pressed by Marilyn McCord Adams, "Hell and the God of Justice" (1975), among others. An endless penalty for wrongs done in a short, limited life looks unjust by every standard of justice we use anywhere else.
The case for belief
Augustine, The City of God, Book XXI (426). The traditional view: punishment for those who reject God is real and lasting, grounded in Jesus' own words in Matthew 25:46.
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (1940) and The Great Divorce (1945). "The doors of hell are locked on the inside." And: "There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, 'Thy will be done,' and those to whom God says, in the end, 'Thy will be done.'"
Isaac the Syrian (7th century). Those in Gehenna are "scourged by the scourge of love." The same love of God is joy to those who welcome it and torment to those who refuse it.
Genesis 18:25. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?" Abraham's question, which many believers rest on when they cannot say who is in and who is out.
Two other Christian views
Christian universalism: Gregory of Nyssa (4th century), Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God (1999), David Bentley Hart, That All Shall Be Saved (2019). A perfectly loving God will in the end win every person, however long it takes.
Conditional immortality: Edward Fudge, The Fire That Consumes (1982), with John Stott's cautious support in Evangelical Essentials (1988). The lost are finally destroyed, not kept alive to suffer forever.
Everybody is born into the same conditions. Same era, same place, same means, same access, same preaching. Same start line.
The question: Where and when you are born shapes almost everything, even whether you ever hear about God. How can that be fair?
Sam calls it the lottery. A herdsman on a cold plain eleven hundred years ago never heard the name. Sam wants to know who decided that, and he builds a world where nobody's straw comes up short.
The case that it counts against God
John Hick, God Has Many Names (1980) and An Interpretation of Religion (1989). In the great majority of cases, the religion a person holds depends on where they happened to be born. That makes it hard to believe one tradition alone has the whole truth.
Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" (1979), and Linda Zagzebski, "Religious Luck" (1994). If a person's eternal destiny depends on circumstances nobody chooses, then it seems to turn on luck, which sits badly with a just God.
Robert Merrihew Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil" (1977). A Christian philosopher's objection to one popular answer (below): nothing seems to make it true what a person would freely do in circumstances that never happen, so God could not know it in advance.
The case for belief
Acts 17:26 to 27. God "determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their dwelling place, that they should seek God, and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him."
William Lane Craig, "No Other Name" (1989). Because God knows how every possible person would freely respond, he may have ordered history so that anyone who would have responded to the message is born where they will hear it.
C. S. Lewis, The Last Battle (1956), and Clark Pinnock, A Wideness in God's Mercy (1992). God may judge people by how they responded to the light they actually had, not the light they never saw.
A point both sides have to reckon with
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), and Robert Adams, "Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil" (1979). Change the circumstances of anyone's birth and a different person is born. Any argument about a fairer start has to say who, exactly, would have been around to enjoy it.
Every animal other than humans behaves exactly as it does now. It feels no pain and no fear. Nothing else changes.
The question: Free will cannot explain the pain of animals that lived and died long before any human. Why would a good God allow it?
Sam calls this his clean case. Every time he has pushed on the pain people cause, the believer's answer has been free will. But a gazelle doesn't sin, and nobody's character is being built in a gazelle. So if God could spare animals their pain, he could do it without touching anybody's freedom at all.
The case that it counts against God
Charles Darwin, letter to Asa Gray (1860). "I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars."
William Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" (1979). A fawn is trapped in a forest fire and lies in agony for days before it dies, with no one to see it and no good that seems to come of it. If suffering like that really is pointless, a good God probably does not exist.
Paul Draper, "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" (1989). The way pain and pleasure are spread through living things fits a universe indifferent to us better than one made by a good God.
The case for belief
Stephen Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering" (1984). Skeptical theism: if there is a God whose mind is far beyond ours, we should not expect to see his reasons for everything. Not seeing a reason is weak evidence that there is none.
Michael Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw (2008). A careful survey of Christian answers. A world governed by stable laws and developing toward rich, complex life may require creatures able to feel pain.
Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation (2008). Evolution may have been the only way to create such a variety of creatures. God suffers with every creature and promises the redemption of creation itself (Romans 8:19 to 22).
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (1940), "Animal Pain". Lewis separates sensation from a self that lives through its pain over time, and asks how much animals suffer in the way we do. He holds the question open and says so.